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Abstract
The paper investigates, in the framework of branching space-times,
whether an infinite EPR-like correlation which does not involve finite
EPR-like correlations is possible.
1 Introduction
The question addressed in the present paper is the following: Is an infinite
EPR-like correlation which does not involve finite EPR-like correlations pos-
sible? To explain what finite / infinite refers to in this context, recall the
essence of the Einstein-Podolski-Rosen’s (1935) set-up: two particles emer-
ging from a source are subjected to position (or momentum) measurements at
distant locations in such a way that the two measurement events are space-
like separated. The result is a (perfect) correlation between outcomes of
position measurements (or momentum measurements): if the position mea-
sured on the first particle is such-and-such, then the position measured on
the second particle is certainly such-and-such. The correlation is finite, as
it refers to outcomes of two measurements, performed, say, at the left and
at the right station. In the subsequent investigations of EPR-like correla-
tions (and of Bell’s theorem), set-ups with more measurement stations were
considered. Thus, Mermin (1990) considers correlated triples of outcomes
of spin measurements – in this case a trio of outgoing particles is subjected
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to spin measurements at three stations. And Greenberger et al. (1989) in-
vestigate a set-up with four particles and hence: four measurement stations
and quadruples of correlated outcomes. Accordingly, in our usage, the size
of a correlation (and hence the distinction: finite vs. infinite) refers to the
number of correlated measurement outcomes.
Clearly, the crux of our problem is the notion of possibility, as it occurs
in our question. It is perhaps interesting to learn that an infinite EPR-like
correlation which does not involve finite EPR-like correlations is logically /
mathematically possible; yet, we are after a sharper notion of possibility. On
the other extreme, our investigations have nothing to do with experimental
possibility, i.e. the possibility of producing an experimental set-up for infinite
correlations. Somewhat similarly, we leave aside the question whether quan-
tum theory permits infinite EPR-like correlations. Instead we focus on what
we take to be essential aspects of EPR-like correlations: its spatiotemporal
and modal features. As for the former, we assume that the experiment occurs
in Minkowski space-time. The modal aspect is seen in the popular diagnosis
of EPR, which says that although every outcome of a single measurement is
possible, certain combinations of outcomes (or, equivalently, a joint outcome)
is impossible. To illustrate, although + as well as − are possible outcomes of
spin measurement, as performed on one particle, the outcome ++, that is +
on both the particles, is impossible. A final word of warning: we neglect the
probabilistic aspect of EPR-like correlations, and we do it for two reasons.
First, we focus on perfect correlations and anti-correlations, and we read the
extreme probabilities as ‘it must happen / it cannot happen’. Second, we
believe that in EPR correlations the modal aspect has a conceptual priority
over the probabilistic one.
Given the above assumptions, the essence of EPR-like correlations is as
follows: in Minkowski space-time, there is a number (finite or not) of mea-
surement events, every two of which are space-like separated. For each mea-
surement event there is a set of possible ‘single’ outcomes. Yet, certain
combinations of single outcomes are impossible.
EPR-like correlations, as described above, can be rigorously investigated
in (a non-probabilistic version of) branching space-times (BST), a theory pro-
posed by Belnap (1992).1 The BST framework rigorously combines modality
and (rudiments of) special relativity. It has been used to diagnose Bell’s
theorem.2 In this theory, a feature analogous to pre-probabilistic EPR-like
correlation is called ”modal funny business”, which is defined so as to capture
the idea that a certain combination of otherwise possible outcomes of space-
1For the updated version of this paper, see its “postprint”.
2Cf. Belnap and Szabo´ (1996) and Placek (2000).
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like separated measurement events is impossible. The investigation of this
notion brought Mu¨ller (2005) to ask whether infinite modal funny business
which would not involve finite modal funny business was possible. It is this
question that sparked our interest in the issues discussed here. In a sense,
the question was answered in the positive by Mu¨ller, Belnap, and Kohei
(2006). They produced a set-theoretical structure (called M2 and described
here in Section 4) which satisfies all the axioms of BST and exhibits infinite
modal funny business without there being finite modal funny business. Yet,
the structure has no relation to any space-time, incl. Minkowski space-time.
Thus, the intriguing question remains: namely, can there be in Minkowski
space-time a case of infinite modal funny business which does not involve
finite modal funny business?
This state of affairs brings in our first task. Contrary to first appearances,
BST has models the possible histories (analogous to Lewis-style possible
worlds) of which are not associated with Minkowski space-time (or even any
space-time). Thus, to investigate whether infinite EPR-like correlations are
possible, we had better single out those BST models in which histories are
isomorphic to Minkowski space-times. We call such models Minkowskian
branching structures (MBS for short). In defining this notion we follow the
lead of Mu¨ller (2002), yet with two crucial diversions. First, we remove
Mu¨ller’s finiteness assumptions, as they prohibit introduction of ‘interesting’
infinite structures. Second, we improve on Mu¨ller’s failed proof of the most
desired feature of MBS, namely that every history is isomorphic to Minkowski
space-time. To this end we assume a certain topological postulate.
As our second task, we single out two postulates such that each generates
infinite funny business in an arbitrary BST model, and such that if none
holds in a BST model, the model is free from infinite funny business.
We finally show that in an MBS, if there is infinite funny business, a set
in ℜ4 which generates it must be very strangely located. We also show that
truth of the first postulate (A) requires a converging sequence of measurement
events. We finally exhibit an MBS model in which the other postulate (B)
is true, yet the model has an odd feature, which (we conjecture) is necessary
for the truth of the postulate. Thus, our findings strongly say against a
possibility of INFFB in physically motivated models of BST.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review some defini-
tions and facts of BST which we need later. Section 3 defines and discusses
Minkowskian branching structures. Section 4 provides definitions of modal
funny business for general BST, introduces two postulates, and relates the
occurrence / non-occurrence of infinite funny business in BST to the satisfac-
tion (or not) of those postulates. Section 5 links the above to Minkowskian
branching structures: it asks what the postulates presuppose of MBS, and
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hence, for what price one can have in Minkowski space-time an infinite EPR-
like correlation which does not involve finite correlations. The final section 6
states our conclusions and poses some open problems.
2 Branching Space-Times
The theory of Branching Space-Times (BST), as presented by Nuel Belnap
in 1992 Belnap (1992), combines objective indeterminism and relativity in
a rigorous way. Its primitives are a nonempty set W (called “Our World”,
interpreted as the set of all possible point events) and a partial ordering 6
on W , interpreted as a “causal order” between point events.
There are no “Possible Worlds” in this theory; there is only one world,
Our World, containing all that is (timelessly) possible. Instead, a notion of
“history” is used, as defined below:
Definition 1 A set h ⊆ W is upward-directed iff ∀e1, e2 ∈ h ∃e ∈ h such
that e1 6 e and e2 6 e.
A set h is maximal with respect to the above property iff ∀g ∈ W such
that g ! h, g is not upward-directed.
A subset h of W is a history iff it is a maximal upward-directed set.
For histories h1 and h2, any maximal element in h1∩h2 is called a choice
point for h1 and h2.
A very important feature of BST is that histories are closed downward:
if e1 6 e2 and e1 /∈ h, then e2 /∈ h. In other words, there is no backward
branching among histories in BST. No two incompatible events are in the
past of any event; equivalently: the past of any event is “fixed”, containing
only compatible events.
We will now give the definition of a BST model; for more information
about BST in general see Belnap (1992).
Definition 2 〈W,6〉 where W is a nonempty set and 6 is a partial ordering
on W is a model of BST if and only if it meets the following requirements:
1. The ordering 6 is dense.
2. 6 has no maximal elements.
3. Every lower bounded chain in W has an infimum in W .
4. Every upper bounded chain in W has a supremum in every history that
contains it.
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5. (Prior choice principle (’PCP’)) For any lower bounded chain O ∈
h1 − h2 there exists a point e ∈ W such that e is maximal in h1 ∩ h2
and ∀e′ ∈ O e < e′.
3 IntroducingMinkowskian Branching Struc-
tures
BST is a frugal theory, since it allows for models whose histories hardly have
spacetimes, and the only ’spatiotemporal’ notion is that of the ordering 6.
We are going to single out a class of BST models, in which histories occur in
spacetimes, and moreover, all these spacetimes are Minkowskian. This part
of our work is based on Mu¨ller’s [2002] theory.
The points of the Minkowskian space-time are elements of R4, e.g. x =
〈x0, x1, x2, x3〉, where the first element of the quadruple is the time coordi-
nate. The Minkowskian space-time distance (Lorentz interval) is a function
D2M : R
4 × R4 → R defined as follows (for x, y ∈ R4):
D2M(x, y) := −(x0 − y0)2 +
3∑
i=1
(xi − yi)2 (1)
The natural ordering on the Minkowski space-time, call it “Minkowskian
ordering 6M”, is defined as follows (x, y ∈ R4):
x 6M y iff D
2
M(x, y) 6 0 and x
0 6 y0 (2)
We will say that two points x, y ∈ R4 are space-like related (“SLR” for
short) iff neither x 6M y nor y 6M x. Naturally, x <M y iff x 6= y and
x 6M y.
Now we need to provide a framework for “different ways in which things
can happen” and for filling the space-times with content. For the first task
we will need a set Σ of labels σ, η, .... (In contrast to Mu¨ller (2002), we allow
for any cardinality of Σ). For the second task, we will use a so called “state”
function S : Σ × R4 → P , where P is a set of point properties (on this we
just quote Mu¨ller saying “finding out what the right P is is a question of
physics, not one of conceptual analysis”).
One could ask about the reasons for an extra notion of a “scenario”. Why
don’t we build histories just out of points from R4 × P ? The reason is that
a member of BST’s Our World has a fixed past. If two different trains of
events lead to exactly the same event E ∈ R4 × P , the situation gives rise
to two different point events, two different members of W . In contrast: for
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a point 〈x, p0〉 from R4 × P there can exist two different points 〈y, p1〉 and
〈y, p2〉 from R4 × P such that y <M x. This would be a case of backward
branching, so the set R4 × P is not a good candidate for the master set W
of any BST model.
The idea behind the concept of scenario is that every scenario corresponds
to a R4 space filled with content3, where the content derives from the elements
of P . Assuming a certain state function S is given, for any σ, η ∈ Σ the
set Cση ⊂ R4 is the set of “splitting points” between scenarios σ and η,
intuitively: the set of points in which a choice between the two scenarios
is made. All members of Cση have to be space-like related. Of course a
choice between σ and η is a choice between η and σ, so Cση = Cησ. The BST
axiom of prior choice principle motivates our postulate that any two different
scenarios split. Formally: ∀σ, η ∈ Σ (σ 6= η ⇒ Cση 6= ∅).
The next requirement concerns triples of scenarios. Any set Cση deter-
mines a region in which both scenarios coincide: namely, that part of R4 that
is not in the Minkowskian sense strictly above any point from Cση. Following
Mu¨ller we call it the region of overlap Rση between scenarios σ, η defined as
below:
Rση := {x ∈ R4|¬∃y ∈ Cση y <M x} (3)
(Of course it follows that for any σ, η ∈ ΣCση ⊆ Rση.) Assuming the sets Cση
and Cηγ are given, we get two regions of overlaps Rση and Rηγ . At the points
in the intersection of those two regions σ coincides with η and η coincides
with γ, therefore by transitivity σ coincides with γ. In general we can say
that for any σ, η, γ ∈ R4
Rσγ ⊇ Rση ∩ Rηγ (4)
which translated to a requirement on sets of splitting points is
∀x ∈ Cσγ∃y ∈ Cση ∪ Cηγy 6M x. (5)
In his paper Mu¨ller put another requirement on Cση: finitude. The mo-
tivation was to exclude splitting along a “simultaneity slice”. The strong
requirement of finitude excludes however many more types of situations, in
which splitting is not continuous or happens in a region of space-time of a
finite diameter. In the present paper we drop this requirement, not putting
any restrictions on the cardinality of Cση for any σ, η ∈ Σ. As a sidenote,
this leads to the fact that in some models there may be choice points which
are not intuitively connected with any splitting point. For details, see 7.1 in
the Appendix.
3Fix a scenario α. The above mentioned corresponding space filled with content is
A ⊆ R4 × P such that 〈x, p〉 ∈ A iff S(α, x) = p.
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The state function assigns to each pair 〈a label from Σ, a point from R4〉
an element of P . Colloquially, the state function tells us what happens at a
certain point of the space-time in a given scenario. 4
After Mu¨ller (2002), we now proceed to construct the elements of MBS
version of Our World; they will be equivalence classes of a certain relation
6S on Σ×R4. For convenience, we write the elements of Σ×R4 as xσ where
x ∈ R4, σ ∈ Σ. The idea is to “glue together” points in regions of overlap;
hence the relation is defined as below:
xσ ≡S yη iff x = y and x ∈ Rση (6)
Mu¨ller provides a simple proof of the fact that ≡S is an equivalence relation
on Σ× R4; therefore we can produce a quotient structure. The result is the
set B being the MBS version of Our World:
B := (Σ×R4)/ ≡S = {[xσ]|σ ∈ Σ, x ∈ R4}. (7)
where [xσ] is the equivalence class of x with respect to the relation ≡S:
[xσ] = {xη|xσ ≡S xη}. (8)
Next, we define a relation 6S on B:
[xσ] 6S [yη] iff x 6M y and xσ ≡S xη (9)
which (as Mu¨ller shows) is a partial ordering on B.
The goal would now be to prove that 〈B,6S〉 is a model of BST. To do
so, and in particular to prove the prior choice principle and requirement no.
4 from definition 2, we need to know more about the shape of the histories
in MBS - that they are the intended ones.
3.1 The shape of MBS histories
We would like histories, that is: maximal upward-directed sets, to be sets of
equivalence classes [xσ] (with respect to ≡S) for x ∈ R4 for some σ ∈ Σ. In
other words, we wish to unambiguously refer to any history by a label from
Σ, requiring one-to-one correspondence of the sets of histories and labels.
This is Mu¨ller’s [2002] Lemma 3 and our
Theorem 3 Every history in a given MBS is of the form h = {[xσ]|x ∈ R4}
for some σ ∈ Σ.
4We can look at the situation from a slightly different perspective: every label σ is
assigned a mapping Sσ from R
4 to P ; see also previous footnote.
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The problem is that, aside from minor brushing up required by the proof
of the “right” direction, the proof of the “left” direction supplied in Mu¨ller
(2002) needs to be fixed as it does not provide adequate reasons for nonemp-
tiness of an essential intersection
⋂
Σh(zi). More on that below. Let us
divide the above theorem into two lemmas (4 and 8) corresponding to the
directions and prove the “right” direction first. Until we prove the theorem
we refrain from using the term “history” and substitute it with a “maximal
upward-directed set” for clarity.
Lemma 4 If h = {[xσ]|x ∈ R4} for some σ ∈ Σ than h is a maximal
upward-directed subset of B.
Proof: Let us consider e1, e2 ∈ h, e1 = [xσ], e2 = [yσ]. Since x, y ∈ R4
there exists a z ∈ R4 such that x 6M z and y 6M z. Therefore [xσ] 6S [zσ]
and [yσ] 6S [zσ], and so h is upward-directed.
For maximality, consider a g ⊆ B, g ! h and assume g is upward-directed.
It follows that there exists a point [xη] ∈ g − h such that [xη] 6= [xσ] ∈ h.
Since both points belong to g which is upward-directed, there exists [zα] ∈ g
(note that we are not allowed to choose σ as the index at that point) such
that [xη] 6S [zα] and [xσ] 6S [zα]. Therefore xη ≡S xα ≡S xσ, and so we
arrive at a contradiction by concluding that [xη] = [xσ]. Q.E.D.
The proof of the other direction is more complex and, what might be
surprising, involves a topological postulate. First, we will need a simple
definition:
Definition 5 For a given maximal upward-directed set h and a point x ∈ R4,
Σh(x) := {σ ∈ Σ|[xσ] ∈ h}.
Consider now a given maximal upward-directed set h ⊆ B. With every
lower bounded chain L ⊂ R4 we would like to associate a topology (called
“chain topology”) on the set of Σh(inf(L)). We define the topology by des-
cribing the whole family of closed sets, which is equal to {∅,Σh(inf(L))} ∪
{Σh(l)|l ∈ L}∪{∩{Σh(l)|l ∈ L}}. (Because L is a chain it is evident that the
family is closed with respect to intersection and finite union). The postulate
runs as follows:
Postulate 6 For every maximal upward-directed set h ⊆ B and for every
lower bounded chain L ⊂ R4 the “chain topology” described above is compact.
It is easily verifiable that in such a topology {Σh(l)|l ∈ L} is a centred
family of closed sets (every finite subset of it has a nonempty intersection).
Together with the above postulate we get this result:
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Corollary 7 For every maximal upward-directed set h ⊆ B and for every
chain L ⊂ R4, ⋂{Σh(l)|l ∈ L} 6= ∅.
Lemma 8 If h is a maximal upward-directed subset of B then h = {[xσ]|x ∈
R4} for some σ ∈ Σ.
The structure of the proof mimics the proof of Mu¨ller’s (see Mu¨ller
(2002)). It is divided into three parts, the first and the last being repro-
duced here. On the other hand, the second part contains an error (as stated
above, the statement that
⋂
Σh(zi) 6= ∅ is not properly justified) and bears
on an assumption that for every history h and point x ∈ R4 the set Σh(x)
is at most countably infinite. We wish both to drop this assumption and
correct the proof using the above topological postulate.
Proof: Suppose that h is a maximal upward-directed subset of B. In
order to prove the lemma, we will prove the following three steps:
1. If for some σ, η ∈ Σ both [xσ] ∈ h and [xη] ∈ h, then xσ ≡S xη.
2. There is a σ ∈ Σ such that for every η, if [xη] ∈ h, then xη ≡S xσ.
3. With the σ from step 2, h = {[xσ]|x ∈ R4}.
Ad. 1. Since h is maximal by assumption, there exists a [yγ] ∈ h
such that [xσ] 6S [yγ] and [xη] 6S [yγ]. These last two facts imply that
xσ ≡S xγ ≡S xη, so by transitivity of ≡S we get xσ ≡S xη.
Ad. 2. Assume the contrary: ∀σ ∈ Σ ∃[xη] ∈ h, xη 6≡S xσ.
Take a point [yκ] ∈ h. Accordingly, Σh(y) 6= ∅.
For each scenario σα ∈ Σh(y) we define a set Θα = {x ∈ R4 | ∃η ∈
Σh(y) : [xη] ∈ h ∧ xσα 6≡S xη}, which by our assumption is never empty.
Colloquially, it is a set of the points that make the scenario a wrong candidate
for the proper scenario from our lemma - the scenario “doesn’t fit” the history
at those points. For each scenario σα we would like to choose a single element
of Θα, and to that end we employ a choice function T defined on the set of
subsets of R4 such that T (Θα) ∈ Θα, naming the element chosen by it as
follows: T (Θα) := xα.
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Observe that we will arrive at a contradiction if we prove that⋂
σα∈Σh(y)
Σh(xα) 6= ∅ (10)
(since for any σβ ∈ Σh(y) σβ /∈ Σh(xβ)). In order to apply our topological
postulate, we will construct a chain L = {z0, z1, ... ,zω, ...} of points in R4.
5Bear in mind that since α is a number serving just as an index for scenarios, xα (like
xβ in the line below inequality 10) is a point from R
4 and does not denote a point - scenario
pair.
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It will be lower bounded by its initial element z0. Moreover, we want it to
be vertical, since this way it will (if it does not have an upper bound itself)
contain an upper bound of any point in R4, which will be needed in our proof.
We first define a function “up” which given two points a, b ∈ R4 will
produce a point c ∈ R4 such that c has the same spatial coordinates as a but
is above b. In other words, if a = 〈a0, a1, a2, a3〉 ∈ R4, b = 〈b0, b1, b2, b3〉 ∈ R4,
up(a, b) := 〈a0 + (
3∑
1
(ai − bi)2)1/2, a1, a2, a3〉 ∈ R4. Notice that up is not
commutative.
We proceed to define the above mentioned chain L in the following way:
1.z0 = up(y, x0).
z1 = up(z0, x1).
Generally, zk+1 = up(zk, xk+1).
2. Suppose ρ is a limit number. Define Aρ := {zβ | β < ρ}6. As you can
see, Aρ is the part of our chain we have managed to construct so far. We
need to distinguish two cases:
a) Aρ is upper bounded with respect to6M . Then it has to have “vertical”
upper bounds t0, t1... with spatial coordinates t
i
n = z
i
0 (i = 1, 2, 3). In this
case, we employ the above defined function T to choose one of the upper
bounds of Aρ:
tρ := T ({t ∈ R4 | ∀β < ρ zβ 6M t ∧ ti = zi0(i = 1, 2, 3)}). (11)
Then we put zρ := up(tρ, xρ), arriving at the next element of our chain L.
b) if Aρ is not upper bounded with respect to 6M , then no matter which
point in R4 we choose, it is possible to find a point from Aρ above it (since
Aρ is vertical). Therefore the set
Bρ = {t ∈ Aρ | xρ 6M t} (12)
is not empty. We put [zρ] := T (Bρ), arriving at the next element of our chain
L.
Notice that in our chain it might happen that while α < β, zβ 6M zα, but
z0 is a lower bound of L. Therefore our postulate 6 applies. By employing it
and corollary 7 we infer that⋂
σα∈Σh(y)
{Σh(zα)|zα ∈ L} 6= ∅ (13)
By our construction of the chain L, for all α it is true that xα 6M zα.
Therefore Σh(zα) ⊆ Σh(xα). Thus, from 13 we immediately get⋂
σα∈Σh(y)
Σh(xα) 6= ∅, (14)
6Again: β is just an index, not a scenario, so Aρ is a subset of R
4.
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which is the equation 10 that we tried to show. Therefore we arrive at a
contradiction and part 2 of the proof is complete.
Ad. 3. We have shown that there is a scenario σ ∈ Σ such that all
members of h can be identified as [xσ] for some x ∈ R4. What remains is
to show that the history cannot “exclude” some regions of {σ} × R4, that
is: to prove that for all x ∈ R4, [xσ] ∈ h. But in lemma 4 we have shown
that {[xσ]|x ∈ R4} is a maximal upward-directed subset of B, so any proper
subset of it cannot be maximal upward-directed. Q.E.D.
By showing lemmas 4 and 8 we have proved theorem 3.
3.2 The importance of the topological postulate
So far it might seem that our topological postulate 6 is just a handy trick
for proving the lemma 8. To show its importance we will now prove that its
falsity leads to the falsity of the lemma, and then present an example of a
structure in which the lemma does not hold.
Theorem 9 If the postulate 6 is false, then lemma 8 is also false.
Proof: Assume that our topological postulate does not hold. Therefore
there exists a maximal upward-directed set h ⊆ B and a lower bounded
chain L ⊂ R4 such that the chain topology is not compact. This is by rules
of topology equivalent to the fact that there is a centred family of closed sets
with an empty intersection. But all closed sets in the chain topology form a
chain with respect to inclusion. Of course, if a part of a chain has an empty
intersection, a superset of the part also has an empty intersection. We infer
that ⋂
x∈L
Σh(x) = ∅ (15)
from which, by definition 5, we get that
¬∃σ ∈ Σ : ∀x ∈ L [xσ] ∈ h (16)
so there is no scenario σ such that h = {[xσ]|x ∈ R4}. Thus, lemma 8 is
false. Q.E.D.
In the Appendix (section 7.2) we show a situation in which lemma 8 does
not hold. The construction resembles the M1 structure from Mu¨ller et al.
(2006).
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3.3 BST models and MBS
Having proven theorem 3 we can adopt Mu¨ller’s proof (from Mu¨ller (2002)) of
the fact that 〈B,6S〉 meets all the requirements in definition 2 and conclude
that it is a model of BST. We keep in mind, though, that we have introduced
a new postulate 6 into the proof and shown that it is not trivial (not always
true). We will demand from the structures we would like to call “Minkows-
kian Branching Structures” to meet our topological postulate. This way, a
MBS is a special kind of a BST model: its Our World and ordering 6 are
constructed as respectively B and6S as proposed by Mu¨ller, and furthermore
our postulate 6 is true in the model.
Due to the following self-evident Fact, we have fulfilled our promise from
the introduction and produced BST models in which histories are isomorphic
to Minkowski space-times.
Fact 10 Let W = 〈W,6S〉 be an MBS and let h be a history in W of the
form {[xσ] | x ∈ R4} for a certain σ ∈ Σ. Then
〈h,6S|h〉 ∼= 〈R4,6M 〉
by means of the isomorphism i : h→ R4 such that i([xσ]) = x.
4 Funny business
The rest of the paper concerns the funny business phenomenon in its finitary
and infinitary variants. Funny business in BST is to resemble EPR corre-
lations. The underlying idea is that there are two space-like related events
whose outcomes are correlated in the sense that a combinatorially possible
history is missing. As an example, consider a BST model of the EPR-Bohm
experiment (Bohm, 1951). There are two space-like separated measurement
events e1 and e2, idealized to be point-like. Each has two outcomes, ‘spin
up’ and ‘spin down’, to be written as, resp. H1+, H1− and H2+, H2−. Since
histories with results ‘spin up’ and ‘spin down’ are possible, we assume that
the intersections H1+ ∩H2− and H1− ∩H2+ are nonempty. Yet, we put:
H1+∩H2+ = H1−∩H2− = ∅, since no history with same spin projections is
possible.
Taking a clue from this example, funny business seems to require two
SLR point events e1, e2 such that for some outcomes H1 of e1 and H2 of e2:
H1 ∩H2 = ∅. Since e1 SLR e2, the two share a history. Now, this basic idea
could be generalized in two directions, giving rise to the notions of finitary
funny business and infinitary funny business. As for the former, following
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Belnap (2002) we allow for extended (i.e., not point-like) events, say A and
B, require that they are SLR in the sense that ∀x ∈ A∀y ∈ B (x SLR y),
and we do not postulate that the sum of the two events to be a subset of
a history.7 The result is Belnap’s notion of generalized-primary space-like-
related modal-correlation-funny business, i.e., g-p s-l-r m-c funny business for
short.
To obtain the infinitary version of funny business, consider a set S of
(not necessarily SLR) infinitely many point events and require that any two
elements of S be consistent in the sense that every outcome of the first
event intersects non-emptily with every outcome of the other; that feature
obtains for any finite subset of S. The funny business consists in there being
a set of outcomes of events of S, one outcome for each element of S, the
intersection of which is empty. The resulting notion, which is closely related
to combinatorial funny business of Mu¨ller et al. (2006) gives rise to a more
familiar concept if one further requires that S is pairwise SLR and is a subset
of some history h.
To properly define funny business, we will need a few formal notions.
Definition 11 Hist is the set of all histories in the model. H(e) is the set
of all histories to which point event e belongs.
For e1, e2 ∈W , e1 SLR e2 iff ∃h ∈ Hist : e1, e2 ∈ h and e1 6 e2 and e2 6 e1.
For E1, E2 ⊆W , E1 SLR E2 iff ∀e1 ∈ E1 ∀e2 ∈ E2 : e1 SLR e2.
Next, replacing the informal notion of an event’s outcome, we have a concept
of “elementary possibility at e”, defined as an element of a certain partition
of H(e). The partition is an equivalence relation ≡e on H(e) which is to convey
the sense of “being undivided in e” - sharing a point above e.
Definition 12 Consider h1, h2 ∈ H(e). h1 ≡e h2 iff ∃e∗ > e such that
e∗ ∈ h1 ∩ h2. h1 ⊥e h2 iff h1, h2 ∈ H(e) and it is not the case that h1 ≡e h2.
The relation ≡e is an equivalence relation on H(e) due to BST postulates, as
shown in Belnap (1992), Facts 45–46.
Definition 13 If h ∈ H(e), we say that Πe〈h〉 ⊆ H(e) is an elementary
possibility (open) in e iff it is the equivalence class of the history h w.r.t.
the relation ≡e. If x ∈ W and e < x, by Πe〈x〉 we mean the elementary
possibility in e to which history h ∈ H(x) belongs.
Following the existing literature we define Πe as the set of all elementary
possibilities at e.
7The reason for this selection is, in the last instance, the existence of ‘nice’ theorems
following from this concept. For more, cf. footnote ? of Belnap (2002).
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Next, for a given set S we will consider functions f which, given a point
e ∈ S as an argument, produce an elementary possibility from Πe. Collo-
quially speaking, function f resembles a pointer, indicating for every e ∈ S
which elementary possibility at e is selected. Formally, a pointer function is
an element of the set
∏
e∈S Πe of product functions, defined as follows: :∏
e∈S
Πe = {f : S →
⋃
e∈S
Πe : ∀e′ ∈ S f(e′) ∈ Πe′} (17)
The definitions of no (in)finitary funny business and (in)finitary funny busi-
ness run as follows:
Definition 14 Assume S ⊆W and a function f ∈ ∏
e∈S
Πe.
〈S, f〉 is not a case of finitary funny business iff for any A1, A2 ⊆ S:
if A1 SLR A2 and
⋂{f(e) : e ∈ Ai} 6= ∅ for i = 1, 2, then ⋂{f(e) : e ∈
A1 ∪ A2} 6= ∅.
〈S, f〉 is not a case of infinitary funny business iff (1) card(S) < ω
or (2) ∃A (A ⊆fin S ∧ ∀h ∈ Hist; A 6⊆ h) or (3) if ∀e, e′ ∈ S (e < e′ →
f(e′) ⊆ f(e)), then ⋂{f(e) : e ∈ S} 6= ∅.
S does not give rise to (in)finitary funny business iff ∀f ∈ ∏
e∈S
Πe
〈S, f〉 is not a case of (in)finitary funny business.
On this definition, 〈S, f〉 is a case of finitary funny business iff there are
A1, A2 ⊆ S such that A1 SLR A2 and
⋂{f(e) : e ∈ Ai} 6= ∅ for i = 1, 2 but⋂{f(e) : e ∈ A1 ∪A2} = ∅. I.e., this is a case of Belnap’s g-p s-l-r m-c funny
business (for details, see Appendix).
And 〈S, f〉 is a case of infinitary funny business iff (1) card(S) > ω and
(2) ∀A (A ⊆fin S → ∃h ∈ Hist : A ⊆ h), and (3) ∀e, e′ ∈ S (e < e′ →
f(e′) ⊆ f(e)) and (4) ⋂{f(e) : e ∈ S} = ∅. To see the rationale underlying
clause (3), note that due to that clause, there is no infinitary funny business
if for some e, e′ ∈ S (e < e′ ∧ f(e′) 6⊆ f(e)), which entails, by properties of
elementary possibilities, that (*) f(e′)∩f(e) = ∅. In other words, the reason
why the infinite intersection (4) is empty is that the intersection (*) is empty.
In a similar vein, by clause (2), we do not call it infinitary funny business if
some finite subset of S is inconsistent: in this case there is nothing funny in⋂{f(e) : e ∈ S} = ∅, as this follows from the above.
The relation to Mu¨ller et al. (2006)’s notion of combinatorial funny busi-
ness is this:
If 〈S, f〉 is a case of infinitary funny business, then 〈S, f〉 constitutes a case
of combinatorial funny business. In the other direction, if 〈S, f〉 constitutes a
case of combinatorial funny business but 〈S, f〉 is not a case of finitary funny
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business, then 〈S, f〉 is a case of infinitary funny business. For details, see
Appendix.
One might find the above definitions not completely intuitive or even
objectionable, and to some extend we share this feeling. For instance, in
what follows, while discussing finitary and infinitary funny business, we are
concerned with only such S that are pairwise SLR and a subset of a history.
So, the definitions given above are too general for our purposes. Despite these
disadvantages, we assume them since they are closely related to the extant
definitions, and there are some odd structures arising from S that is neither
pairwise SLR nor a subset of a history. For brevity, from now on instead
of “finitary funny business” we will usually write “FINFB” and instead of
“infinitary funny business” we will usually write “INFFB”. We will also say
that NO FINFB (NO INFFB) is true in a BST model W = 〈W,6〉 meaning
that no S ⊆W gives rise to FINFB (INFFB).
4.1 M2
Mu¨ller et al. (2006) introduced a certain BST structure named M2, in which
FINFB was absent, whereas INFFB was present. We will now briefly repro-
duce their definition, because it is an interesting example of funny business
and we will use it in our theorems. For a detailed discussion and a proof that
M2 is a BST model with the above properties, see the mentioned paper.
M2 is a pair 〈W,6〉. W is a union of four sets: W0 = (−∞, 0], W1 =
(0, 1]×N, W2 = (1, 2)×N×{0, 1} and W3 = [2,∞)×F where F is the set of
all functions g : N→ {0, 1} such that for only finitely many n ∈ N, g(n) = 0.
The strict partial ordering < is the transitive closure of the following four
relations:
• For e, e1 from the same Wi: e < e1 iff the first coordinate of e is smaller
than that of e1 and the other coordinates are the same.
• x < (y, n) for every x ∈W0 and (y, n) ∈W1.
• For (x, n) ∈W1 and (y,m, i) ∈ W2 : (x, n) < (y,m, i) iff n = m.
• For (x, n, i) ∈W2 and (y, g) ∈W3 : (x, n, i) < (y, g) iff (g(n) = i.
The non-strict companion 6 of < is defined as usual: e 6 e′ iff e < e′ or
e = e′. The structure M2 has a countable set Hist of histories and also a
countable set of binary choice points S = {〈1, n〉 : n ∈ N}. Moreover, there is
one-to-one correspondence between Hist and F, which allows us to identify
values of product functions (i.e., elementary possibilities) with certain subsets
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of F. At each point e = 〈1, n〉 there are two elementary possibilities, both
of the form {g ∈ F | g(n) = b}, where b is 0 or 1. Taking now a product
function f ∈ ∏
e∈S
Πe such that f(〈1, n〉) = {g ∈ F | g(n) = 0}, it is easy to
see that 〈S, f〉 is a case of INFFB since in F there is no function z such that
z(x) = 0 for every x ∈ N. On the other hand, there is no case of FINFB
in M2 (see Mu¨ller et al. (2006)). Thus, M2 is just a case in point: it has
INFFB that does not involve any case of FINFB. In a due time, we will ask
if the structure can be ‘converted’ into a MBS. At this stage, let us note some
‘strange’ features ofM2. First, in M2 a point above some two choice points is
always above an infinite number of choice points. Also, in M2 one can define
a certain ‘odd’ subset X, of which our Postulate B (to be introduced later)
is true. Namely,
X := {〈3
2
, n, 0〉 | n ∈ N} (18)
X is strange because it is not a subset of any history, yet, every finite subset
of X is contained in some history.
4.2 Results
One might expect that there are cases of INFFB that involve FINFB: indeed
the theorem below justifies this intuition and gives it a precise reading.
Theorem 15 If 〈S, f〉 is a case of FINFB and for some history hS: S ⊆ hS,
then there are S ′ ⊆W and f ′ ∈ ∏
e∈S′
Πe such that 〈S ′, f ′〉 is a case of INFFB.
Proof: By the assumption, there are A,B ⊆ S such that (1) A SLR B and
(2) hA ∈
⋂{f(e) : e ∈ A}, (3) hB ∈ ⋂{f(e) : e ∈ B} but (4) ⋂{f(e) : e ∈
A ∪ B} = ∅. Clearly, (5) A ⊆ hA ∩ hS and (6) B ⊆ hB ∩ hS. If A ∪ B is
infinite, put: S ′ = A ∪B and f ′ = f|A∪B, and go to (†). If A ∪B is is finite,
define now S ′ := {x ∈ hS | ¬∃e1 ∈ A, e2 ∈ B (x > e1 ∧ x > e2)}.
Let us first argue that S ′ is infinite. Pick a: a maximal element of A
and b: a maximal element of B; since both share hS, there is y such that
y > a ∧ y > b. Consider next a chain la from y to a, such that inf(la) = a.
If (7) ∀x (x > a → x > b), then la is lower bounded by b. Yet, since a
is the infimum, i.e., the greatest lower bound of la, it must be that a > b,
which contradicts (1). Hence, since (7) cannot be true, there is an x such
that x < y and x > a but x 6> b. BST’s postulate of density implies that
Z := {z ∈ la | z < x} is infinite; since Z ⊆ S ′, S ′ is infinite as well.
As for the next condition of INFFB, since S ′ ⊆ hS, it must be that
∀A ⊆fin S ′ A ⊆ hS.
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We define f ′ ∈ ∏
e∈S′
Πe:
f ′(e) =


f(e) if e ∈ A ∪ B
Πe〈hA〉 if e 6∈ A ∪ B and ∃x ∈ A(e < x)
Πe〈hB〉 if e 6∈ A ∪B and ∃x ∈ B(e < x)
Πe〈hS〉 otherwise
(†) By the definitions of S ′ and f ′ and (1)-(6) we have: ∀e, e′ ∈ S ′ (e < e′ →
f ′(e′) ⊆ f ′(e)). By (4), since A∪B ⊆ S ′, we get ⋂{f ′(e) : e ∈ S ′} = ∅. .
Our title question, however, is just the opposite: are there cases of INFFB
that do not involve FINFB? Before we turn to our main theorems, let us first
show some simpler facts:
Corollary 16 Suppose that A ⊆ S is finite and pairwise SLR. Then, if S
does not give rise to FINFB,
⋂
e∈A
{f(e)} 6= ∅ for any f ∈ ∏
e∈S
Πe.
The corollary stems from the fact that any finite set is a union of a finite
family of singletons.
Theorem 17 Assume that S is an infinite set of pairwise SLR points such
that for some history h, S ⊆ h.
If there exist sets A1, A2 such that A1 ∪ A2 = S and none of them gives
rise to INFFB, then (if S gives rise to INFFB, then S gives rise to FINFB).
Proof: From the first antecedent we get that ∀f ∈ ∏
e∈A1
:
⋂{f(e) : e ∈
A1} 6= ∅ and a similar result for A2. From the second antecedent we get that
∃g ∈ ∏
e∈S
:
⋂{f(e) : e ∈ S} = ∅. We can of course think of the function
g defined on S as a union of two functions defined respectively on A1 and
A2. Thus, we see that 〈S, g〉 constitute a case of FINFB because
⋂{g(e) :
e ∈ Ai} 6= ∅ and
⋂{g(e) : e ∈ A2} 6= ∅ while ⋂{g(e) : e ∈ A1 ∪ A2} = ∅.
Therefore S gives rise to FINFB. Q.E.D.
The above theorem yields us the following simple corollary:
Corollary 18 Assume S is an infinite set of pairwise SLR points such that
for some history h, S ⊆ h. Then, if S does not give rise to FINFB and
there exists a cofinite subset of S which does not give rise to INFFB, then
the whole set S does not give rise to INFFB.
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Turning to our main theorems characterizing INFFB, we will now intro-
duce two postulates and prove a few theorems about and show how they
relate to FINFB and INFFB.
Postulate 19 (Postulate A) There exist 1) a set S ⊆ W which is an
infinite set of pairwise SLR points such that for some history h S ⊆ h and
2) a function f ∈ ∏
e∈S
Πe such that
∃e ∈ S ∀h ∈ Hist ∀x ∈W :
(x /∈ h ∨ ¬(x > e) ∨ h /∈ f(e) ∨ ∃e1 ∈ S(h /∈ f(e1) ∧ ¬(x SLR e1)))
The motivation for this postulate comes from a certain structure, called
M1, that Mu¨ller et al. (2006) introduced. In this structure, one tries ‘by hand’
to prohibit the existence of a certain history, by this means producing a case
of INFFB, without there being a case of FINFB. This procedure, however,
fails if Postulate A is false. In this case, a seemingly excluded history gets
re-inserted “by force” by Kuratowski-Zorn Lemma. Namely, the falsity of
Postulate A ensures the existence of a certain function that can be used to
produce a chain of events, which extends, by Kuratowski-Zorn lemma to the
seemingly excluded history. More precisely, if Postulate A is false, then for
any infinite pairwise SLR set S such that for some history h S ⊆ h and for
any function f ∈ ∏
e∈S
Πe we can define a function F : S → Hist×W in the
following way (e ∈ S):
F (e) := 〈h, x〉 : (x > e ∧ x ∈ h ∧ h ∈ f(e) ∧ ∀e′∈S(h /∈ f(e′)⇒ e′ SLR x))
(19)
(Of course many different functions meeting this requirement might exist as
there might be many equally good candidates for h and x such that for a
given e F (e) = 〈h, x〉. What is important for us is that, when Postulate
A is false, such functions do exist; we will just choose one.) Thus, we as-
sume Postulate A in order Kuratowski-Zorn lemma not to produce unwanted
histories.
As for the second postulate, it relates to structure M2 and a question
why it contains a case of INFFB. Our tentative diagnosis is that in M2 one
can define a certain ‘odd’ subset X (see Equation 18), of which the postulate
below is true:
Postulate 20 (Postulate B) There is a set X ⊆ W such that
(a) for any A ⊆fin X, there is a history h: A ⊆ h;
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(b) there is no history h such that X ⊆ h.
The theorems we will show are summarized in the list below:
1. (Theorem 21) PostulateA⇒INFFB
2. (Theorem 22) PostulateB∧ NO FINFB ⇒ INFFB
3. (Theorem 23) Given that the BST model has space-time points,
NO FINFB ∧¬(Post.A) ∧ ¬(Post.B)⇒ NO INFFB
4. (Theorem 24) PostulateA; FINFB
5. (Theorem 25) ¬(PostulateA) ∧ PostulateB ; FINFB
As for “space-time points” mentioned in theorem 23, in its proof we want
to be able to say that something happens “in the same space-time point” in
different histories. A triple 〈W,6, s〉 is a “BSTmodel with space-time points”
(BST+S) iff 〈W,6〉 is a BST model and s (from the expression “space-time
point”) is an equivalence relation on W such that 1) for each history h in W
and for each equivalence class s(x), x ∈W , the intersection h∩s(x) contains
exactly one element and 2) s respects the ordering: for equivalence classes
s(x), s(y) and histories h1, h2, s(x) ∩ h1 = s(y)∩ h1 iff s(x) ∩ h2 = s(y)∩ h2,
and the same for “<” and “>”. As Mu¨ller shows in Mu¨ller (2005), not every
BST model can be extended to a BST+S model, so our theorem is not as
general as we would ideally prefer.
Theorem 21 Suppose Postulate A is true due to some S ⊆ W and f ∈∏
e∈S
Πe. Then 〈S, f〉 is a case of INFFB.
Proof: Since by the assumption S is infinite, pairwise SLR, and for some
history h: S ⊆ h, we have: (1) card(S) > ω and (2) ∀A (A ⊆fin S → ∃h ∈
Hist : A ⊆ h), and (3) ∀e, e′ ∈ S (e < e′ → f(e′) ⊆ f(e)). We need thus
to show (4)
⋂{f(e)|e ∈ S} = ∅. For reductio assume ⋂{f(e)|e ∈ S} 6= ∅.
Hence, there must be a history (a) h∗ ∈ ⋂{f(e)|e ∈ S}. Suppose e∗ ∈ S
is one of the points of which the existential formula of Postulate A is true.
Since it follows that h∗ ∈ f(e∗), it is true for e∗ that
∀x ∈W (x /∈ h∗ ∨ ¬(x > e∗) ∨ ∃e1 ∈ S(h∗ /∈ f(e1) ∧ ¬(x SLR e1))). (20)
Again, since h∗ ∈ f(e∗) and there are no maximal elements in the model (see
BST postulate 2 of Definition 2), we can find a point x∗ such that x∗ > e∗
and x∗ ∈ h∗. In other words, for this x∗ two elements of the above alternative
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are false - so the third one must be true. But it also is false, since one of
the conjuncts is always false: namely, because of (a) it can’t be true for any
e1 ∈ S that h∗ /∈ f(e1). So the whole alternative is false for x∗, and thus we
arrive at a contradiction. Therefore
⋂{f(e)|e ∈ S} = ∅ so 〈S, f〉 constitute
a case of INFFB. Q.E.D.
We will now establish that INFFB follows from Postulate B together with
NO FINFB. Suppose that Postulate B is true due to a certain set X. Our
goal is to find a set S and a function f such that 〈S, f〉 is a case of INFFB.
Theorem 22 Suppose that in a BST modelW = 〈W,6〉 Postulate B is true
and no S ⊆ W gives rise to FINFB. Then there exists a case of INFFB in
the model, i.e., there exists a set S ⊆ W and a function f ∈ ∏
e∈S
Πe such that
〈S, f〉 is a case of INFFB.
Proof: Let X ⊆ W be a set of which Postulate B is true. Define:
C(x) := {e ∈ W | ∃h(h ∈ Hist ∧ h ⊥e H(x))} (21)
S :=
⋃
x∈X
C(x) (22)
The assumption of NO FINFB and a fact about location of choice points (see
Appendix, Fact 41) entail (a) ∀e(e ∈ C(x) → e < x), so it makes sense to
write Πe〈x〉 if e ∈ C(x). We thus tentatively define the product function f
on S:
f(e) := Πe〈x〉 iff e ∈ C(x).
To check that this is indeed a good definition, we need to prove that if (b)
e ∈ C(x) ∩ C(y) and x 6= y, then Πe〈x〉 = Πe〈y〉. Assume to the contrary
that (c) Πe〈x〉 6= Πe〈y〉. Then, since by (a) and (b): e < x ∧ e < y, it must
be by (c) that (d) H(x) ⊥e H(y). But, by Postulate B (a), there must be a
history h∗ such that {x, y} ⊆ h, and hence h∗ ∈ H(x) and h∗ ∈ H(y), which
contradicts (d).
Turning to the conditions of INFFB, we will first argue that
(f) ∀e, e′ ∈ S (e < e′ → f(e′) ⊆ f(e)).
If e, e′ ∈ C(x), then by the definition of f : f(e) = f(e′). So, let e ∈ C(x),
e′ ∈ C(y) and x 6= y. By Postulate B (a), ∃hxy ∈ H : {x, y} ⊆ hxy..
Accordingly, hxy ∈ Πe〈hxy〉 = Πe〈x〉 = f(e) and hxy ∈ Πe′〈hxy〉 = Πe′〈y〉 =
f(e′). Accordingly, Πe〈x〉 ∩ Πe′〈y〉 6= ∅. Moreover, since e < e′, Πe′〈y〉 ⊆
Πe〈x〉 6= ∅, i.e., f(e′) ⊆ f(e).
Next, we prove the following:
(g) If h ∈ ⋂{f(e) | e ∈ S}, then X ⊆ h.
Indirectly, let for some h: h ∈ ⋂{f(e) | e ∈ S} and assume that there is
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x ∈ X such that x 6∈ X. Take any hx such that x ∈ hx. Clearly, x ∈ hx/h,
so by PCP: ∃e ∈ W : (h ⊥e hx ∧ e < x), from which (i) h ⊥e H(x) follows.
Thus, e ∈ C(x). By the assumption, h ∈ f(e) = Πe〈x〉, and hence h ≡e H(x).
This contradicts (i), however.
Now, Postulate B (b) says that ¬∃h ∈ Hist X ⊆ h, so (g) implies that
(j)
⋂{f(e) | e ∈ S} = ∅.
We next prove that
(k) if A ⊆fin S, then
⋂{f(e) | e ∈ A} 6= ∅.
If A is finite, then there is a set A∗ of maximal elements of A. Clearly, A∗
is pairwise SLR. Hence, since no S ⊆ W gives rise to FINFB, it follows by
Corollary (16) that
(l)
⋂{f(e) | e ∈ A∗} 6= ∅. By the construction, if e ∈ A/A∗, then there is
e′ ∈ A∗ such that e < e′. By (f) then, f(e′) ⊆ f(e). This and (l) entail that⋂{f(e) | e ∈ A} 6= ∅.
Importantly, (k) has two sought-for consequences:
(m) if A ⊆fin S, then ∃h ∈ Hist (A ⊆ h) and
(n) card(S) > ω. Otherwise, by (g) and (k) there would be a history h such
that X ⊆ h, which contradicts Postulate B (b).
To see that 〈S, f〉 is a case of INFFB, we need to show that (1) card(S) >
ω and (2) ∀A (A ⊆fin S → ∃h ∈ Hist : A ⊆ h), and (3) ∀e, e′ ∈ S (e <
e′ → f(e′) ⊆ f(e)) and (4) ⋂{f(e) : e ∈ S} = ∅. Yet, we already established
these conditions: (1) is (n), (2) is (m), (3) is (f) and (4) is (j). 
Note that S, as constructed in the proof above, gives rise to INFFB but it
needs neither to be pairwise SLR, nor a subset of a history. Thus, it might be
that funny business generated by Postulate B is even stranger than expected,
as for instance S might have no maximal elements. To secure a more familiar
INFFB, i.e., such that S is pairwise SLR and a subset of a history, we need
another requirement, called Supplement, which refers to S from the proof
above:
Supplement Every chain in S is upper bounded and for some h∗ ∈ Hist:
S ⊆ h∗.
We leave it to the reader to show that if Postulate B and Supplement are
true and no S ⊆ W gives rise to FINFB, then there exists a set S∗ that is
pairwise SLR and a subset of history and gives rise to INFFB. The set in
question can be defined as:
S∗ = {suph∗(l) | l is a maximal chain in S}
where S is defined in (22) and h∗ is the history to which Supplement refers.
The sought-for product function f ′ on S∗ should be defined for such e that
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e ∈ S∗/S as well. Thus,
f ′(e) :=
{
Πe〈x〉 iff e ∈ C(x);
Πe〈h∗〉 iff e ∈ S∗/S.
It is now time to prove our main theorem.
Theorem 23 Suppose W = 〈W,6〉 is a BST+S model and no S ⊆ W gives
rise to FINFB. Suppose further that both Postulates A and B are false in W.
Then no infinite set S of pairwise SLR points such that for some history h:
S ⊆ h gives rise to INFFB.
Proof: Suppose that S is infinite, pairwise SLR and a subset of a history.
Since 〈S, f〉 not being a case of INFFB is equivalent to the disjunction of four
conditions, it suffices to to show that one of these conditions obtains. That is,
we will prove that for any product function f on S, (a)
⋂{f(e) : e ∈ S} 6= ∅.
Consider S as naturally indexed by its cardinality. Since Postulate A is
false, there is a function F : S → Hist×W defined as in (19). Take e0 ∈ S.
For some x0 ∈ W and h0 ∈ Hist we have that F (e0) = 〈h0, x0〉. Consider
S0 := {e ∈ S : h0 ∈ f(e) ∧ x0 > e}. If S0 = S, we have completed the proof
and h0 is the desired history, since then ∀e ∈ S0 (h0 ∈ f(e)).
Otherwise, the construction guarantees that x0 SLR (S/S0). Namely, if
e ∈ S/S0 and h0 6∈ f(e), then by the definition of F (see eq. (19)), x0 SLR
e. And, if (b) h0 ∈ f(e), it cannot be that e < x0, because then e ∈ S0. It
cannot be that e > x0, either, since this implies e > e0. By (b): e ∈ h0, and
from the definition of F : x0 ∈ h0, and hence x0 SLR e.
Take then a point from S/S0 (say, a point ei such that i is the minimal
index in the set of indexes of points from S/S0) and call it e1. So, for some
x′1 ∈ W and h′1 ∈ Hist we have that F (e1) = 〈h′1, x′1〉. From NO FINFB
(applied to the SLR set {x0, e1}) we get that H(x0) ∩ Πe1〈h′1〉 6= ∅ so there
is a history h1 belonging to the intersection. Clearly, x0 ∈ h1. Since W
is by assumption a BST+S model, we can take a point x1 := s(x
′
1) ∩ h1.
Accordingly, {x0, x1} ⊆ h1. We define Σ1 := {x0, x1} and HΣ1 := {h ∈
Hist | Σ1 ⊆ h}. Take S1 := {e ∈ S/S0 : h1 ∈ f(e) ∧ x1 > e}. On the
occasion that S = S0 ∪S1 we have completed the proof and h1 is the desired
history. For, we have that ∀e (e ∈ S0 ∪ S1 → h1 ∈ f(e)). If S 6= S0 ∪ S1, we
continue similarly with a point e2 ∈ S/(S0 ∪ S1).
The above two steps should give us an idea of what to do while moving
from ek to ek+1. Suppose we finished the k-th step and accordingly we have
set Sk, history hk and set Σk ⊆ hk. If S/
⋃
06i6k
Si 6= ∅, the theorem is not
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proved yet, so we take a point from S/
⋃
06i6k
Si and label it ek+1. So, for
some x′k+1 ∈ W and h′k+1 ∈ Hist we have that F (ek+1) = 〈h′k+1, x′k+1〉.
From NO FINFB (applied to set Σk ∪{ek+1} as Σk SLR {ek+1}) we get that
HΣk∩Πek+1〈h′k+1〉 6= ∅ so there is a history hk+1 belonging to the intersection.
Take xk+1 := s(x
′
k+1)∩ hk+1 and put Σk+1 = Σk ∪ {xk+1}. Of course Σk+1 ⊆
hk+1. Define Sk+1 := {e ∈ S/
⋃
06i6k
Si : hk+1 ∈ f(e) ∧ xk+1 > e}. On the
occasion that S =
⋃
06i6k+1
Si we have completed the proof and hk+1 is the
desired history. If not, we continue similarly with a point ek+2 ∈ S/
⋃
06i6k+1
Si.
Let us now move to the limit case. Consider the set
⋃
k<ω
Σk. It possesses
the following properties:
• For every finite subset A ⊆fin
⋃
k<ω
Σk there exists a history h : A ⊆ h
(since it is finite, A has to be a subset of Σk for some k < ω, and so
A ⊆ hk);
• It is infinite (since ∀i,j(i 6= j ⇒ Σi 6= Σj)).
Therefore, the set is of the kind that Postulate B speaks about. Since we
assumed its negation, we infer that there is a history h∗ ∈ Hist such that⋃
k<ω
Σk ⊆ h∗. If S =
⋃
k<ω
Sk, the theorem is proved and h
∗ is the desired
history.
Suppose however that S/
⋃
k<ω
Sk 6= ∅. Take a point eω ∈ S −
⋃
k<ω
Sk. So,
for some x′ω ∈ W,h′ω ∈ Hist it is so that F (eω) = 〈h′ω, x′ω〉. Consider sets
A1 := {ei : 0 6 i < ω} and A2 := {eω} From the construction it follows that
there are histories h∗ and h′ω such that h
∗ ∈ ⋂
e∈A1
f(e) and h′ω ∈
⋂
e∈A2
f(e).
So, by NO FINFB (applied to A1 ∪ A2),
⋂
e6ω
f(e) 6= ∅, so there is a history
hω belonging to the intersection. Put xω := s(x
′
ω)∩ hω and let Σω := {xω} ∪
{s(x) ∩ hω : x ∈
⋃
k<ω
Σk}. Let Sω := {e ∈ S/
⋃
k<ω
Σk : hω ∈ f(e) ∧ xω > e}.
If S =
⋃
k6ω
Sk we have completed the proof and hω is the desired history.
If not, we continue similarly with points from S/
⋃
k6ω
Sk. Since we have given
instructions on what to do with e point ei whether i is a limit number or
not (the above case with ω is easily generalized), we are bound to arrive at
a desirable history h ∈ ⋂{f(e) : e ∈ S}. Q.E.D.
The last two theorems in this section are to show that the first two theo-
rems from the list above are not useless: since FINFB leads to INFFB, we
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need to make sure that neither Postulate A nor Postulate B yields FINFB.
Theorem 24 If a set S ⊆ W is an infinite set of pairwise SLR points such
that for some history h S ⊆ h and a function f ∈ ∏
e∈S
Πe satisfies this condi-
tion:
∃e ∈ S ∀h ∈ Hist ∀x ∈W :
x /∈ h ∨ ¬(x > e) ∨ h /∈ F (e) ∨ ∃e1 ∈ S(h /∈ f(e1) ∧ ¬(x SLR e1))
then it does not follow that 〈S, f〉 is a case of FINFB.
Proof sketch. Our example will take place in a MBS. Unfortunately, during
the construction we have run into similar problems as with theorem 35: na-
mely, we can present a proper set if we restrict ourselves to R2, while the R4
case involves an intuitive extension of our idea which unfortunately would be
formally painful. Thus we will show the R2 case. The second coordinate is
spatial. (By “(a, b)” we will sometimes mean “a point in R2”or “a segment
of R”, but it will always be clear from the context.)
Let S1 = {(0, x) ∈ R2 : x ∈ (0, 1)} be a dense segment of splitting points.
Suppose all choice points generated by S1 are binary and label one possibility
“0” and the other “1”. Assume that each scenario from Σ corresponds to
a history belonging to only a finite number of “0”-possibilities (in harmony
with lemma 8, there are no other histories). Put B := (Σ× R2)/ ≡S .
The set of choice points generated by S1 will be called S. S = {[(0, x)σ] :
x ∈ (0, 1), σ ∈ Σ}. Consider a function f ∈ ∏
e∈S
Πe such that
f([(0, x)σ]) =
{
1 if x > 1/2
0 if x < 1/2
The point that will make Postulate A true is [(0, 1/2)σ]. It is because it is
true that
∀x ∈W ∀h ∈ Hist :
(x ∈ h ∧ h ∈ f([(0, 1/2)σ]) ∧ x > [(0, 1/2)σ])⇒ ∃e1 ∈ S(h /∈ f(e1)x > e1)
which we arrive at by transforming Postulate A. And the above is true be-
cause any point above [(0, 1/2)σ] is also above an infinite number of points
[(0, x)σ] such that x ∈ (0, 1/2). Any history has to belong to the “1”-
possibility in some of those points, contrary to what function f dictates.
Now we have to show that 〈S, f〉 do not constitute a case of FINFB. Consi-
der A,B ⊆ S. If {[(0, x)σ] : x ∈ (0, 1/2)} ∩ A is infinite or {[(0, x)σ] : x ∈
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(0, 1/2)}∩B is infinite, then from our assumption about the histories in our
model we infer that
⋂{f(e) : e ∈ A} = ∅ (resp. ⋂{f(e) : e ∈ A} = ∅), so the
antecedent from the definition of NO FINFB is false. In the other case, if
both {[(0, x)σ] : x ∈ (0, 1/2)}∩A and {[(0, x)σ] : x ∈ (0, 1/2)}∩B are finite,
then {[(0, x)σ] : x ∈ (0, 1/2)} ∩ (A ∪ B) is finite, therefore (again, by our
assumption about the histories in the model)
⋂{f(e) : e ∈ A ∪ B} 6= ∅, so
the consequent from the definition of NO FINFB is false. Therefore, 〈S, f〉
do not constitute a case of FINFB.
Theorem 25 Suppose Postulate A is false, whereas Postulate B is true in
our model and X is the set whose existence is entailed by Postulate B. It does
not follow that S gives rise to FINFB.
Proof by observation: M2 provides us with an appropriate example (see sec-
tion 4.1). Set X, as defined in Equation (18), is exactly of the kind required
by Postulate B. As for Postulate A, it is false iff for every infinite S that is
pairwise SLR and a subset of a history and for every product function on S,
there is a function F , as defined in Equation (19). Clearly, in M2 there are
plenty of infinite sets that are pairwise SLR and subsets of a history. Yet,
as long as such a set does not contain a choice point, the construction of
a function satisfying the conditions on F is straightforward and we leave it
to the reader. The only case requiring some attention is if a set described
above contains a choice point. Observe that the set of choice points in M2 is
S ′ = {〈1, n〉 : n ∈ N}. Thus, we need to say what value F takes on elements
of S ′:8
F (〈1, n〉) := 〈g, 〈3/2, n, i〉〉,
where i = 0, 1 and g is some function from F such that g(n) = i. It is easy
to see that this function satisfies conditions on F (19). Thus, since for every
infinite S that is pairwise SLR and a subset of a history and for every product
function on S, there is a sought-for function F , Postulate A is false in M2.
Finally, as shown in Mu¨ller et al. (2006), there is no funny business in M2.
The upshot of this section is this: generally, there are exactly two ways
of producing INFFB, where there is no case of FINFB: by Postulate A and
by Postulate B. In the next section, we will investigate if these postulates
can be true in MBS.
8We can write this since there is one-to-one correspondence between Hist and F inM2.
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5 Funny business in MBS
In this section we ask under what conditions there could be cases of INFFB
in MBS. Since (as we have seen) there are generally two ways of producing
INFFB, namely by our Postulates A and B, we also ask what these postulates
amount to in MBS’s.
We begin with showing a simple fact, namely that under some conditions,
there is NO INFFB in MBS. Imagine an infinite, pairwise SLR set of choice
points. If you can divide the set into finite “chunks” separated by a minimal
distance, the set does not give rise to infinitary funny business.
Condition 26 There exists a real number δ ∈ R such that for any infinite,
pairwise SLR set of choice points S and for any x ∈ R4, if x is above only a
finite number of points of SM , then so is 〈x0 + δ, x1, x2, x3〉 ∈ R4.
Notice that truth of condition 26 in a given model implies, for example,
that there are no convergent sequences in any pairwise SLR set of choice
points S in that model.
Fact 27 Suppose NOFINFB is true in an MBS W. If condition 26 is also
true in W, then no 〈S, f〉 such that S is an infinite, pairwise SLR set of
choice points and f ∈ ∏
e∈S
Πe gives rise to INFFB.
Proof: Suppose S is an infinite, pairwise SLR set of choice points,
f ∈ ∏
e∈S
Πe and 〈S, f〉 gives rise to INFFB (*). We will obtain a contradiction
by showing that there is a history hL ∈
⋂
e∈S
f(e), and we will arrive at this
history by constructing a certain denumerable chain L = {l0, l1...}.
Take a point [e0σ] ∈ S9. Put l0 := [e0σ] and S0 := {[e0σ]}. Since e0
is above only a finite number of points of SM (one, to be exact), we apply
condition 26 and put x1 := 〈e00+ δ, e1.e2, e3〉. Let S1 = (S/S0)∩{[xσ] : x <M
x1 and σ is a scenario }. S1 is finite. Therefore, by NOFINFB, both
⋂
e∈S0
f(e)
and
⋂
e∈S1
f(e) are nonempty; so, again by NOFINFB,
⋂
e∈S0∪S1
f(e) 6= ∅. We
take a history hσ1 ∈
⋂
e∈S0∪S1
f(e) and put l1 := [x1σ1]. It is evident from the
construction that l0 < l1.
9We hope it is clear from the context that e0 ∈ R4 and σ ∈ Σ. For clarity, in similar
cases (when the point from R4 has a subscript) we do not want to write the scenario as a
subscript, too.
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Suppose lk = [xkσk]. Since xk is above only a finite number of points of
SM (they all belong to the set
k⋃
i=0
Si, which is a sum of a finite number of
finite sets), we apply condition 26 and put xk+1 := 〈x0k + δ, e1.e2, e3〉. Let
Sk+1 = (S/
k⋃
i=0
Si) ∩ {[xσ] : x <M xk+1 and σ is a scenario }. Sk+1 is finite.
Then
⋂
e∈
kS
i=0
Si
f(e) 6= ∅ (because e.g. hσk belongs to it) and
⋂
e∈Sk+1
f(e) 6= ∅
(by NOFINFB). Then, again by NOFINFB,
⋂
e∈
k+1S
i=0
Si
f(e) 6= ∅. We take a
history hσk+1 ∈
⋂
e∈
k+1S
i=0
Si
f(e) and put lk+1 := [xk+1σk+1]. It is evident from the
construction that lk < lk+1.
We have described the procedure for creating the chain L. By laws of
BST, there has to be a history hL containing the chain. We claim that
hL ∈
⋂
e∈S
f(e). Suppose, to the contrary, that hL /∈
⋂
e∈S
f(e). So ∃e ∈ S :
hL /∈ f(e)(**). By our construction, there has to be a natural n such that
e ∈ Sn. Since hL ≡e hσn and hσn ∈ f(e), we get that hL ∈ f(e), which
contradicts (**). We know, then, that hL ∈
⋂
e∈S
f(e), which contradicts (*).
Q.E.D.
We know now that under some conditions there is NO INFFB in an MBS.
Since one way of introducing INFFB is via Postulate A, let us investigate
what this postulate amounts to in an MBS. It will turn out that we can
introduce a certain kind of funny business (“epsilon funny business”, labeled
ǫFB), present whenever Postulate A is true. This will give us some details
about the situations in which funny business can arise in MBS’.
Definition 28 Let S ⊆ W . We will say that SM = {z ∈ R4 : ∃σ ∈ Σ :
[zσ] ∈ S} is a reduced set derived from S.
In other words, the reduced set of a subset S of W is what we get after
projecting S on R4; it is the set of spatiotemporal locations occupied by
members of S.
Definition 29 We say that in an MBS model W an infinite pairwise SLR
set S, whose all elements have the form [zσ] for a given σ ∈ Σ, and a product
function f constitute ǫFB iff
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∃e∗ ∈ SM ∀ǫ(e∗)
⋂
e∈ǫ(e∗)
f([eσ]) = ∅,
where SM is the reduced set derived from S, ǫ(e
∗) = {e ∈ SM |d(e, e∗) < δ}
for some δ ∈ ℜ and d() is the Euclidean distance.
Theorem 30 If in an MBS model W there is (1) an infinite pairwise SLR
set S = {[zσ] : z∈ Z ⊂ℜ4} and (2) a product function f such that S and f
constitute ǫFB, then Postulate A is true in W.
Proof: To prove Postulate A, take S, f and some e∗, whose existence is
postulated by ǫFB . As a sidenote, observe that, since No FIN FB is assumed
to be true, it follows from ∀ǫ(e∗) ⋂
e∈ǫ(e∗)
f([eσ]) = ∅ that every neighborhood
ǫ(e∗) comprises infinitely many elements of SM . This is possible only if e
∗ is
a point of convergence of a sequence in SM (a special case is dense SM).
We need to show that for every triple 〈γ, x, α〉 (γ, α ∈ Σ, x ∈ ℜ4) the
following formula is true:
[xα] 6= [xγ ] ∨ [e∗σ] 6= [e∗α] ∨ x 6> e∗ ∨ γ 6∈ f([e∗σ])∨
∃[e′σ] ∈ S(γ 6∈ f([e′σ]) ∧ ¬(x SLRMe′)).
(23)
The formula is the disjunction D1 ∨D2 ∨D3 ∨D4 ∨D5. For a triple 〈γ, x, α〉
we consider now two cases. It may be that for that triple D1∨D2∨D3∨D4 is
true, and hence, obviously, the entire disjunction (23) is true as well. In the
other case, D1 ∨D2 ∨D3 ∨D4 is not true for the triple, i.e., the conjunction
¬D1 ∧ ¬D2 ∧ ¬D3 ∧ ¬D4 obtains. For Postulate A to be true, in this case
the triple must make D5 true, i.e.,
∃[e′σ] ∈ S (γ 6∈ f([e′σ]) ∧ ¬(x SLRMe′)). (24)
We will now show this. Since by ¬D3: x > e∗, we may define a nonempty
subset B(x) of SM , whose elements are in the backward light cone of x, i.e.,
B(x) := {z ∈ SM |z <M x}. Observe now that for all e from SM (a) e ∈ B(x)
iff ¬(e SLRM x). The implication to the right is obvious; to see that the
reverse implication holds as well, note that it holds if e′ < x. And e′ > x is
impossible, since it implies (as x > e∗) that for some e ∈ SM e′ > e, which
contradicts that SM is pairwise SLR.
Now by (a), Formula 24 is equivalent to:
∃[e′σ] ∈ S (γ 6∈ f([e′σ]) ∧ e′ ∈ B(x)),
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which is equivalent to:
¬∀[e′σ] ∈ S (e′ ∈ B(x)→ γ ∈ f([e′σ])),
and further equivalent to:
γ 6∈
⋂
e′∈B(x)
f([e′σ]). (25)
From the construction of B(x) and ǫFB :
∃ǫ(e∗) ǫ(e∗) ⊆ B(x) ∧
⋂
e′∈ǫ(e∗)
f([e′σ]) = ∅.
It follows that
⋂
e′∈B(x)
f([e′σ]) = ∅. So it cannot be that γ ∈
⋂
e′∈B(x)
f([e′σ]), and
thus the formula 25 and hence D5 must be true.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 31 If Postulate A is true in an MBS model W, then there is in
W an infinite pairwise SLR set S, whose all elements have the form [zσ] for
a given σ ∈ Σ, and a product function f such that S and f constitute ǫFB.
Proof: Let Postulate A be true in W due to S, f , and e∗. For reductio, as-
sume that S and f do not constitute ǫFB. We get that ∃ǫ(e∗) ⋂
e∈ǫ(e∗)
f([eσ]) 6=
∅. We will construct a triple x, γ, α that contradicts Postulate A. Take the
γ ∈ ⋂
e∈ǫ(e∗)
f([eσ]) for some ǫ(e
∗) and x >M e
∗ such that B(x) ⊆ ǫ(e∗). (It is
always possible to find such an x since we are in an MBS and thus are sear-
ching in R4.) Accordingly, γ ∈ ⋂
e∈B(x)
f([eσ]). Because ∀e′ (e′ ∈ S/B(x) →
x SLRM e
′), we arrive at a contradiction with D5. Since clearly e
∗ ∈ ǫ(e∗),
we have γ ∈ f([e∗σ]), which contradicts D4. x >M e∗ contradicts D3. To
obtain a contradiction with D1, let α = γ. Since γ ∈ f([e∗σ]), [e∗σ] = [e∗γ ], and
hence [e∗σ] = [e
∗
α], which contradicts D2. Thus, the triple x, α, γ contradicts
the disjunction D1 ∨D2 ∨D3 ∨D4 ∨D5, and hence Postulate A. Q.E.D.
Theorems 30 and 31 give us the following fact about the equivalence of
Postulate A and epsilon funny business:
Fact 32 Let W be an MBS model. The following conditions are equivalent:
(1) Postulate A is true in W
(2) There is in W an infinite pairwise SLR set S = {[zσ] : z∈SM ⊆ ℜ4}
and a product function f such that S and f constitute ǫFB.
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Note the consequences of this fact. In order Postulate A be true in an
MBS, there must be in the reduced set SM such an e
∗ that
⋂
e∈ǫ(e∗)
f([eσ]) = ∅,
no matter how small the diameter of ǫ(e∗) is. The intersection cannot be
empty if it is possible to have an ǫ(e∗) to which only e∗ belongs. Also, on
the supposition that NO FINFB is true, the intersection cannot be empty if
some ǫ(e∗) contain only a finite subset of SM . Hence, in MBS Postulate A
can be true provided that SM contain a convergent sequence, together with
its point of convergence.
We will finally check whether Postulate B is false in MBS’. To this end, it
would be enough to prove that in an MBS, if ¬ Postulate A and NO FINFB
were true, then NO INFFB was true as well. Given the Theorem (22), this
would imply that Postulate B was false in MBS’.
To begin our exploration, let us ask what form a pairwise SLR set S,
which is a subset of a history, should take to give rise to funny business,
INFFB or FINFB, in an MBS. Assume thus that S is a subset of W , all
elements of which have the form [eσ] for a given σ ∈ Σ. Clearly, S is a subset
of a history. Consider a product function f on S, and assume that 〈S, f〉 is
a case of funny business, FINFB or INFFB. Thus,⋂
[eσ]∈S
f([eσ]) = ∅.
Pick now some a∗ = 〈a∗0, a∗1, a∗2, a∗3〉 ∈ SM and consider elements of ℜ4 located
‘vertically’ above a∗, i.e., the set L := {x | x = 〈x0, a∗1, a∗2, a∗3〉 ∧ x0 > a∗0}.
Our guiding idea is this: we want to see what has to happen if 〈S, f〉 is
to be a case of funny business, FINFB or INFFB. Usually there exist ‘safe’
subsets of S such that there is a history passing through all the elementary
possibilities designated by the function f at the points from the subsets.
Suppose that it is not the case regarding the whole set S (meaning that
we have an example of funny business). What, then, with the ‘in-between’
section - the sets larger then the obviously ‘safe’ ones and smaller than the
whole S? Does there have to be a biggest ‘safe’ set, or a smaller ‘unsafe’ set?
Let us put these ideas down formally. For x ∈ L, we will say that x is good
iff for Sx := {[eσ] ∈ S | e 6M x}:
⋂
[eσ]∈Sx
f([eσ]) 6= ∅. If x is not good, we will
say it is bad.
Clearly, a∗ is good, and if x, y ∈ L, x <M y, and y is good, then x is good
as well. Hence there are initial non-empty segments of L, whose all elements
are good. We call such initial segments “good”. The question now is: what
maximal good initial segments of L are possible? (Since the sum of a set
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of good segments is a good segment, for any chain a maximal good initial
segment will exist.) There are two possibilities:
(1) The maximal good initial segment of L is not upper bounded, and
hence is identical to L. By an argument similar to that given at the end of
our proof of Fact 27, there is a history hL ∈
⋂
[eσ]∈S
f([eσ]); hence 〈S, f〉 is not
a case of funny business, i.e., we have neither FINFB nor INFFB.
(2) The maximal good initial segment of L is upper bounded, so by properties
of ℜ4 and our construction, it has a supremum; dub it x∗. Is then x∗ good
or bad? Again, there are two options:
(2a) x∗ is bad. We already know that for any x < x∗, x ∈ L is good.
Hence, funny business is located, so to speak, on the backward light cone of
x∗, i.e., on B|x∗ = {x ∈ ℜ4 | x <M x∗ ∧ D2M(x, x∗) = 0} (where D2M is the
Lorentz interval). In other words, defining S ′ = {[eσ] ∈ S | e ∈ B|x∗}, we
have it that 〈S ′f〉 is a case of funny business, FINFB or INFFB.
(2b) x∗ is good. This means that any x > x∗, x ∈ L is bad. Hence, on
any outer lining (however thin) Bx∗(δ) = {x ∈ ℜ4 | x <M x∗(δ) ∧ x 6 M x∗},
where x∗(δ) = 〈x∗0 + δ, x∗1, x∗2, x∗3〉, of the backward light cone of x∗, there is
located a case of funny business. More precisely, defining S(δ) = {[eσ] ∈ S |
e ∈ Bx∗(δ)}, we have it that for any δ, 〈S(δ), f〉 is a case of funny business,
FINFB or INFFB.
Thus, the result of this exploration is that if a pairwise SLR set S (where
S ⊆ h for some history) gives rise to funny business in an MBS, then there
is x∗ ∈ ℜ4 and one of two conditions obtains:
(1) on the backward light cone of x∗ there is the reduced set S ′M of S
′ such
that S ′ ⊆ S and S ′ gives rise to funny business, or
(2) on any outer lining of the backward light cone of x∗ there is the reduced
set SM(δ) ∈ ℜ4 of S(δ) such that S(δ) ⊆ S and S(δ) gives rise to funny
business. To put it more precisely,
Fact 33 If a pairwise SLR set S, which is a subset of a history gives rise to
funny business (FINFB or INFFB) in an MBS, then there is x∗ ∈ ℜ4 such
that either (1) there is a set S ′ ⊆ S giving rise to funny business, whose
reduced set S ′M is a subset of B|x∗ = {x ∈ ℜ4 | x <M x∗∧D2M(x, x∗) = 0}, or
(2) there is a family of sets S(δ) ⊆ S, δ > 0, each S(δ) giving rise to funny
business, and such that the reduced set SM(δ) of S(δ) is a subset of Bx∗(δ) =
{x ∈ ℜ4 | x <M x∗(δ) ∧ x 6 M x∗}, where x∗(δ) = 〈x∗0 + δ, x∗1, x∗2, x∗3〉.
Note that S can be different from S ′ as well as from any S(δ).
Let us observe the first consequence of this exploration: in MBS-like
models produced on ℜ2, a pairwise SLR set which is a subset of a history
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cannot give rise to INFFB if ¬ Postulate A and NOFINFB are true.10 In the
two dimensional case, the backward light cone B|x∗ is reduced to two straight
lines, call them “left” and “right”. Since S = {[eσ] | e ∈ SM} (σ ∈ Σ) is
assumed to be pairwise SLR, SM could have at most two elements located
on B|x∗ (one of the left line, the other on the right line). Thus, in two-
dimensional case, if NOFINFB is true, there can be no INFFB located on
the backward light cone of x. Can there be INFFB located on outer linings
Bx∗(δ)? Consider outer linings of one line, say left one. Such outer linings
can be written as BL(δ) = {〈y0, y1〉 ∈ Bx∗(δ) | y1 < x∗1}. Note that, for
e ∈ SM , if e ∈ BL(δ), then no e′ ∈ SM such that e′ <M e can belong to
BL(δ). In a similar vein, no e
′ ∈ SM such that e′ >M a∗ can belong to BL(δ),
where a∗ is that element of SM from which we started the construction of
the chain L containing x∗. Thus, BL(δ) cannot go infinitely down along the
left line, or up to x. Hence, given that NOFINFB is true, in order every
BL(δ) (i.e., for any δ > 0) generate INFFB, there must be a sequence of
elements of SM converging to a point from the left line. Moreover, since
elements of SM are SLRM , there must be exactly one point of convergence
located on the left line. The same is true about right outer linings, BR(δ).
That is, for INFFB to obtain, a sequence in SM must converge to a point
eL located on the left line or a sequence in SM must converge to a point
eR located on the right line. Accordingly, we should consider three cases:
(1) in SM there is only a sequence converging to a point eL on the left line,
(2) in SM there is only a sequence converging to a point eR on the right
line, and (3) in SM there are two sequences, one converging to a certain
eL on the left line and the other converging to a certain eR on the right
line. In each case we need to construct an outer lining Bx∗(δ
∗) that does
not generate INFFB. We will produce the required construction for case
(3) only, as it is more complicated, and the reader will surely know how to
transform it into arguments appropriate for the remaining two cases. Assume
then case (3); it might happen that eL (or eR or both) does not belong to
SM . However, if SM ∪ {eL, eR} := S ′M does not generate INFFB, SM does
not generate it either. Consider thus the ‘extended’ set S ′M . Assume ¬
Postulate A, which (as we have seen in Fact 32), is equivalent to NO ǫFB.
Apply then NO ǫFB to eL and eR, obtaining ǫ(eL) and ǫ(eR), estimated, resp.,
by diameters δL and δR. Put δ
∗ = min{δL, δR} and consider the outer lining
Bx∗(δ
∗). By our construction, the elements of SM that belong to Bx∗(δ
∗),
but neither to ǫ(eL) nor to ǫ(eR) constitute a finite set. By NO ǫFB we have,
10Strictly speaking, we defined MBS models as based on ℜ4, i.e., elements of our models
are equivalence classes [xσ], where x ∈ ℜ4. There is no obstacle, however, to consider
MBS-like models based on ℜn of different dimensionality.
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for any product function f on S ′ = S ∪{[eLσ], [eRσ]}:
⋂
e∈ǫ(eL)
f([eσ]) 6= ∅ and⋂
e∈ǫ(eR)
f([eσ]) 6= ∅. Combining all these observations together, and assuming
NOFINFB, we have an outer lining Bx∗(δ
∗) that does not generate INFFB,
i.e. ⋂
e∈SM∩Bx∗ (δ
∗)
f([eσ]) 6= ∅, which contradicts the result that every outer lining
Bx∗(δ) generates INFFB.
One might hope that this result, i.e., in 2-dimensional MBS-like model,
a pairwise SLR set S, which is a subset of a history cannot give rise to
INFFB if NOFINFB and ¬ Postulate A are true, carries over to the real,
i.e, 4-dimensional MBS. This hope is however shattered by a construction,
which in essence consists in wrapping an M2 structure around a backward
light cone of some x∗.
Consider an MBS whose set Σ of history labels is the set of all func-
tions g : N → {0, 1} such that for only finitely many n ∈ N, g(n) = 0.
Our construction of Section 3.1 guarantees that this is indeed an MBS,
provided that the topological Postulate 6 is true, which we will check in
a due course. Consider x∗ = 〈0, 0, 0, 0〉 ∈ ℜ4, its backward light cone
B|x∗ , and a sequence of ‘angles’ ϕn = π(2
n − 1)/2n (n = 1, 2, . . .). Let
SM = {〈−n, n cos(ϕn), n sin(ϕn), 0〉 | n = 1, 2, . . .}. The (Euclidean) dis-
tance between any two elements of SM is at least
√
2. Also, SM is pairwise
SLRM and SM ⊆ B|x∗. en ∈ SM belongs to appropriate sets of splitting
points, according to this rule:
for g, g′ ∈ Σ, en ∈ Cgg′ iff g(n) 6= g′(n).
We can assign the same history label to all elements of SM , for instance
g∗ such that for all n, g∗(n) = 1. Consider a product function f on S =
{[eng∗] | en ∈ SM} defined as
f([eng
∗]) := {g ∈ Σ | g(n) = 0}.
(Compare our discussion of elementary possibilities in M2 on page 16.) Since
among history labels there is no function g that yields infinitely many zeros,
〈S, f〉 is a case of INFFB. On the other hand, S does not give rise to FINFB,
since there are history labels yielding arbitrarily large finite number of zeros.
Also, since there is a minimal distance
√
2 between elements of SM , one can
associate with every en ∈ SM an ǫ(en) = {e ∈ SM |d(e, en) <
√
2/2} to which
only the singleton {en} belongs. The existence of such epsilons means that
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NO ǫFB is true in our model, and hence, by Fact 32, ¬ Postulate A is true
as well. This means that Postulate B must be true in the model.11
Returning to the topological postulate, the only chains in ℜ4 that might
falsify it are those that contain x∗. As an example, consider the vertical chain
L of elements below x∗, including x∗. Since histories are labeled by elements
of the set Σ, we might write, for z ∈ L, Σg(z) := {g′ ∈ Σ | [zg] = [zg′ ]}, like
in Definition 5.
We have now, for every y 6= x∗ ∈ L: Σg(y) = Σ, whereas Σg(x∗) = {g}.
However odd it looks like, it means that our topological postulate is satisfied,
and hence the described model is indeed an MBS. The oddity is similar to
a feature of M2: no matter which history label is associated with x
∗, the
resulting event in BST is the smallest upper bound of some elements of S
and it cannot be SLR to any remaining element of S. The second trick of our
MBS is that elements of SM escape steadily to the past, which ensures that
there is always a finite distance between them. A natural question is whether
SM bounded on temporal coordinates can yield INFFB if NO FINFB and
¬ Postulate A are true; we leave it as an open problem.
To sum up our investigations of MBS’, we have the following:
(1) If NO FINFB and condition 26 are true, then no infinite and pairwise
SLR set S gives rise to INFFB.
(2) If in an MBS there is funny business (FINFB or INFFB) produced by
a pairwise SLR subset S of a history, then there is some x ∈ ℜ4 such that
either (1) a set S ′ ⊆ S, which gives rise to funny business and whose reduced
set S ′M is located on the backward light cone of x, or (2) any outer lining of
backward light cone of x comprises the reduced set of a set S(δ) ⊆ S which
generates funny business.
(3) In order for Postulate A to be true, given that NOFINFB obtains, there
must be a set of choice points whose reduced set contains a converging se-
quence together with its point of convergence.
(4) Postulate B cannot be true in 2-dimensional MBS-like models if ¬ Pos-
tulate A and NOFINFB are true. However, there are 4-dimensional MBS
models in which Postulate B is true, even although ¬ Postulate A and NO-
FINFB are true. It is an open question whether for such cases to arise one
needs a set SM which is not bounded on the temporal coordinate.
11A reader might want to directly see an odd set X of which Postulate B is true. To
this end, from each en ∈ SM go up a bit (say, by 1/2 on the temporal axis) along the
backward light cone of x∗ and with the resulting point xn ∈ ℜ4 associate a label g such
that g(n) = 0. The totality of [xng] (n ∈ N) is the sought-for X .
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6 Conclusion and open problems
In this paper we have introduced the notion of a Minkowskian Branching
Structure, based on Mu¨ller (2002). In the second part of the paper we have
shown some results concerning finitary and infinitary funny business. There
are exactly two ways of generating INFFB which does not involve FINFB:
via Postulate A or via Postulate B. On the other hand, the falsity of both
postulates in a model with space-time points and NOFINFB entails that
there is NOINFFB in this model. In the third part of the paper we explored
under what conditions there could be INFFB in MBS. We first observed
that if in an MBS model choice points are ‘nicely’ distributed in ℜ4, so that
condition 26 is true, and NOFINFB is true, then there is no case of INFFB
in that model. Also, we have seen that in MBS’ a set S responsible for
funny business must be quite particularly located, namely if there is funny
business produced by a pairwise SLR subset S of a history, then there is
some x ∈ ℜ4 such that either (1) there is a set S ′ ⊆ S, which gives rise to
funny business and whose reduced set S ′M is located on the backward light
cone of x, or (2) any outer lining of the backward light cone of x comprises
the reduced set of a set S(δ) ⊆ S which generates funny business. Our
next finding is that Postulate A can be true in MBS’ (and generate INFFB)
only provided that there is a convergent sequence in reduced set SM of S
which gives rise to INFFB. Finally, we have shown an MBS model in which
Postulate B is true, yet Postulate A and FINFB do not hold; the set X
of which Postulate B speaks is not bounded on the time coordinate. We
conjecture that for Postulate B to be true in an MBS, ‘its’ set X must have
that feature. The moral of our findings is that, spatio-temporally speaking,
INFFB without FINFB is possible; however, since this phenomenon requires
either convergent (in ℜ4) sequences of choice points, or choice points escaping
to infinity on the time coordinate, INFFB without FINFB does not seem to
be physically possible.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Splitting points and choice points
Since it purports to establish that “For histories hσ, hη ⊂ B the set Cσ,η is
the set of choice points”, Lemma 4 in Mu¨ller seems to require reformulation.
A splitting point, as a member of R4, is not a member of B, and thus is not
a choice point.
An obvious move would be to observe that every splitting point x for
scenarios σ and η in a sense “generates” a choice point for histories hσ and
hη. That is, if x ∈ Cση then [xσ] is maximal in hσ ∩ hη.
What might not be as evident is that, since we have dropped the requi-
rement of finitude of every Cση, the converse is not true: in some cases there
are choice points which are not “generated” in the above way by any split-
ting points. We will now try to persuade the reader that this is indeed the
case. The idea is to use sequences of generated splitting points convergent
to the same point. The argument is simple in R2 as we need only two se-
quences, but gets more complicated as the number of dimensions increases.
(For convenience, in the below argument we use symbols “>S” and “>M”
defined in the natural way basing on respectively “6S” and “6M”.)
Definition 34 1. SCση := {[cσ] | c ∈ Cση}
2.Cση := {[xγ ] : (1) [xγ ] ∈ hσ ∩ hη and
(2) ∀z ∈ R4∀α ∈ Σ([zα] >S [xγ ]⇒ [zα] /∈ hσ ∩ hη)
“SCση” is to be read as “The set of generated choice points for histories
hσ and hη”.
“Cση” is to be read as “The set of choice points for histories hσ and hη”.
It is of course irrelevant whether we choose σ or η in square brackets in
the definition of the set of generated choice points, since if c ∈ Cση then
cσ ≡S cη and thus [cσ] = [cη].
Theorem 35 For some Cση, SCση  Cση.
Proof sketch. Again, by fixing two spatial dimensions we will restrict
ourselves to R2. Let x = (0, 0). Let C1 = {(0, 1/n)|n ∈ N\{0}} and C2 =
{(0,−1/n)|n ∈ N\{0}}. Let Cση = C1 ∪ C2. As x /∈ Cση, it is evident that
[xσ] /∈ SCση. We will show that [xσ] ∈ Cση, thus proving the theorem.
We have to show that [xσ] meets conditions (1) and (2) from the above
definition. As for (1), ∀c ∈ Cση x SLR c , so x ∈ Rση. It follows that
xσ ≡S xη and finally (as it is obvious that [xσ] ∈ hσ) that [xσ] ∈ hσ ∩ hη.
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Now for (2). Consider [zα] such that (a) [zα] >S [xσ]. By definition of
>S, z >M x and xα = xσ. Let z = (z0, z1) (the first coordinate is temporal).
We distinguish two cases: either the spatial coordinate z1 is equal to 0 or it’s
something else.
If z = (z0, 0), take k ∈ R, k < z0 such that (0, k) ∈ Cση (such k exists
since C1 converges to (0, 0)). (*) Since D
2
M(z, (0, k)) = k − z1 < 0, it follows
that x >M (0, k) ∈ Cση.
On the other hand, if z1 6= 0, consider v defined as follows:
v :=


1 if z1 ≥ 1
z1 if z1 ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (−1, 0)
−1 if z1 6 −1
We choose (0, k) ∈ Cση such that 0 < k 6 v (if v is positive) or v 6 k < 0
(if v is negative). It is always possible to find such a point since both C1 and
C2 converge to (0, 0). We have to prove that (b) z >M (0, k).
From (a) we know that (c) z >M (0, 0). To arrive at (b) it suffices to show
that (d) z >M (0, v). From (c) it follows that (e) z0 ≥ z1. We have two cases
to consider. First, if (f) z1 ≥ 1 or z1 6 −1, D2M(z, (0, v)) = −z20 +(z1−1)2 =
−z20 + z21 +1−2z1, which (by (f) and (e)) is below 0, which fact is equivalent
to (d). Second, if z1 ∈ (0, 1)∪(−1, 0), D2M(z, (0, v)) = −z20+(z1−z1)2 = −z20
which is of course negative, so again we arrive at (d).
From (c) and (d) and from the requirement on choosing (0, k) we get the
needed result (b).
Since z >M (0, k) ∈ Cση, it is true that z /∈ Rση and thus [zα] /∈ hσ ∩ hη.
We have thus proved that [xσ] fulfills condition (2).
Unfortunately already in R3 the construction fails at point (*). To over-
come the problem we would have to use four sequences of splitting points
convergent to (0, 0, 0) (intuitively situated at the arms of the coordinate sys-
tem). To deal with the situation in R4 we would have to similarly introduce
six sequences convergent to (0, 0, 0, 0). We don’t dwell into the details here
as the point being made doesn’t seem to be significant enough in proportion
to the arduous complexity of the argument.
Conjecture 36 For any scenarios σ, η ∈ Σ, the set Cση contains exclusively
points which belong to SCση or points [xα] such that x is a limit of a sequence
of points belonging to Cση.
7.2 When the topological postulate is false
We will now show a situation in which lemma 8 does not hold. The construc-
tion resembles the M1 structure from Mu¨ller et al. (2006). By fixing two
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spatial dimensions we will restrict ourselves to R2, the first coordinate repre-
senting time.
As usual, Σ is the set of all scenarios of a world B. Let C be the set of
all splitting points:
C :=
⋃
σ,η∈Σ
Cση
We put
C := {〈0, n〉|n ∈ N ∪ {0}} (26)
The idea is that all splitting points are binary: any scenario passing through
a given splitting point can go either “left” or “right”. Since there are as
many splitting points as natural numbers, we can identify Σ with a set of 01-
sequences. Another requirement on Σ is that it contains only the sequences
with finitely many 0s. Let G be a subset of Σ containing only the sequence
without any 0s and all sequences that have all their 0s in the beginning. The
elements of G will be labeled as below:
σ0 = 1111.....
σ1 = 01111....
σ2 = 00111....
σ3 = 00011....
Let us next consider a sequence ZMi of points in R
2 such that for all i ∈
N zi = 〈i − 1/2, 0〉. This way, a given zi ∈ ZMi is in the Minkowskian sense
above all splitting points 〈0, n〉|n < i and above no other splitting points.
Consider now a sequence Zi in B, Zi = {[ziσi]|i ∈ N}12. We will now
show that Zi is a chain. Take any [zmσm], [znσn] ∈ Zi such that m 6= n.
Either m < n or n < m; suppose m < n (the other case is analogous). Since
m < n, zm 6M zn. zm ∈ Rσmσn since it is not above any splitting points
between σm and σn. Therefore zmσm ≡S zmσn, so [zmσm] 6S [znσn]. We
have shown that any two elements of Zi are comparable by 6S . Therefore,
Zi is a chain in B, thus being an upward-directed subset of B.
The set of all upward-directed subsets of B meets the requirements of
Kuratowski-Zorn Lemma, since a set-theoretical sum of any chain subset of
it is also an upward-directed subset of B and is an upper bound of the chain
with respect to inclusion. Therefore, there exists a maximal upward-directed
subset of B (a history h∗) such that Zi ⊆ h∗. But lemma 8 is false with
respect to this history, since for all σ ∈ Σ, h∗ 6= {[xσ]|x ∈ R2}! Suppose
to the contrary, that for a certain σ ∈ Σ h = {[xσ]|x ∈ R2}. As a member
12Again, we hope it is clear from the context that zi ∈ R4 and σi ∈ Σ. For clarity, we
do not want to write the scenario as a subscript.
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of Σ, σ has to contain a “1” at some point k (starting with 0). Then both
[zk+1σk+1] ∈ h∗ and [zk+1σ] ∈ h∗, so zk+1 ∈ Rσkσk+1 . But Cσkσk+1 ∋ 〈0, k〉 6M
zk+1, so zk+1 /∈ Rσkσk+1 and thus we arrive at a contradiction.
We will now show that our topological postulate 6 is not met in this
situation. Consider a chain Z := ZMi ∪ {〈−1, 0〉}. Note that 〈−1, 0〉 =
inf(Z). Consider next the chain topology on Σh∗(〈−1, 0〉) (as defined in the
last section) with Z as the original chain. {Σh∗(zi)} is a centred family of
closed sets, but its intersection is empty as Σ does not contain a scenario
corresponding to the sequence comprised of 0s only. Therefore we arrived at
a contradiction with our corollary 7, so the postulate 6 is not met: the chain
topology is not compact.
8 Equivalences
We will show that our notion of finitary funny business is equivalent to the
Belnap (2002) notion of generalized primary slr modal-correlation funny bu-
siness and our infinitary funny business is ‘almost’ equivalent to the Mu¨ller
et al. (2006) notion of combinatorial funny business.
To recall first Belnap’s definition, he says that two initial events A and B
and their two elementary possibilities ΠA〈hA〉 and ΠB〈hB〉, resp., constitute a
case of generalized primary slr modal-correlation funny business iff A SLR B
and ΠA〈hA〉 ∩ ΠB〈hB〉 = ∅, where A ⊂ hA and B ⊂ hB (initial event is an
upper bounded subset of a history).
Lemma 37 If A and B and their two elementary possibilities ΠA〈hA〉 and
ΠB〈hB〉, resp., constitute a case of generalized primary slr modal-correlation
funny business, then any 〈S, f〉 such that A ∪ B ⊆ S and f ∈ ∏e∈S Πe and
f(e) = Πe〈hA〉 if e ∈ A and f(e) = Πe〈hB〉 if e ∈ B, is a case of finitary
funny business.
The proof is obvious.
Lemma 38 If 〈S, f〉 is a case of finitary funny business, then there are
A,B ⊂ S and their two elementary possibilities, resp., ΠA〈hA〉, ΠB〈hB〉
which constitute a case of generalized primary slr modal-correlation funny
business.
Proof: From the definition of finitary funny business, we have A and B such
that A SLR B and
⋂{f(e) : e ∈ A} 6= ∅, ⋂{f(e) : e ∈ B} 6= ∅. For hA take
then any history from the first intersection, and for hB– any history from the
other. Hence A ⊂ hA and B ⊂ hB. From
⋂{f(e) : e ∈ A∪B} = ∅ it follows
that ΠA〈hA〉 ∩ΠB〈hB〉 = ∅. 
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Turning next to combinatorial funny business, Mu¨ller et al. (2006) define
it in terms of a set T of elementary transition, where elementary transition
is a pair: 〈 point event ei, elementary possibility Hi at ei 〉. Thus, a given
〈S, f〉 uniquely specifies a set of of transitions, and a set of transition uniquely
determines a pair 〈S, f〉. To ease the exposition, in the lemmas below we will
refer to 〈S, f〉 as a set of transitions, and we will claim that under certain
condition, 〈S, f〉 is a case of infinitary funny business iff 〈S, f〉 is a case of
combinatorial funny business.
Mu¨ller et al. (2006) say that set T of elementary transitions is combina-
torially consistent iff for any two transitions ti, tj ∈ T , (1) if ei = ej , then
Hi = Hj, (2) if ei < ej , then H(ej) ⊆ Hi, (3) if ej < ei, then H(ei) ⊆ Hj , and
(4) if ei and ej are incomparable, then ei SLR ej .
Finally, they say that T is consistent iff ∅ 6= HT :=
⋂{Hi | Hi ∈ ti ∧ ti ∈
T} and that T constitutes a case of combinatorial funny business iff T is
combinatorially consistent but inconsistent.
We finally turn to our lemmas:
Lemma 39 If 〈S, f〉 is a case of infinitary funny business, then 〈S, f〉 consti-
tutes a case of combinatorial funny business.
Proof: We need first to show that 〈S, f〉 is consistent. Since f is a function,
condition (1) of combinatorial consistency holds. Conditions (2) and (3) of
combinatorial consistency follow from the condition: ∀e, e′ ∈ S (e < e′ →
f(e′) ⊆ f(e)) of infinitary funny business. (Suppose e < e′. Let f(e′) = Hj
and f(e) = Hi. Since f(e
′) ⊆ f(e), then Hj ⊆ Hi. We need to prove that
H(e′) ⊆ Hi. Suppose to the contrary that (a) there is a history h∗ ∈ H(e′)−Hi.
Since e < e′, there exists a history h ∈ He′∩Hi. From the fact that e′ ∈ h∩h∗
we get that h ≡e h∗, therefore h∗ ∈ Hi and we arrive at a contradiction with
(a).) Condition (4) of combinatorial consistency comes from the condition
∀A (A ⊂fin S → ∃h ∈ Hist : A ⊂ h) of infinitary funny business. Finally,
since HT =
⋂{f(e) : e ∈ S}, by ⋂{f(e) : e ∈ S} = ∅ we get HT = ∅. 
Lemma 40 If 〈S, f〉 constitutes a case of combinatorial funny business but
〈S, f〉 is not a case of finitary funny business, then 〈S, f〉 is a case of infini-
tary funny business.
Proof: From HT = ∅ and HT =
⋂{f(e) : e ∈ S}, it must be that ⋂{f(e) :
e ∈ S} = ∅. Conditions (2) and (3) of consistency entail condition: ∀e, e′ ∈
S (e < e′ → f(e′) ⊆ f(e)) of infinitary funny business. And, if card(S) < ω,
by condition (4) of combinatorial consistency and the assumption that 〈S, f〉
is not a case of finitary funny business, we get that 〈S, f〉 is consistent, i.e.,
not a case of combinatorial funny business. Thus, card(S) > ω. 
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9 Location of choice points
Consider Prior Choice Principle. It says that if (0) x ∈ h/h′, then there is
e such that (1) e < x and (2) h′ ⊥e h. (0) - (2) then entail that ∀h x ∈
h → h′ ⊥e h, which can be written as h′ ⊥e H(x). Thus, defining Ch′(x) :=
{e ∈ W | h′ ⊥e H(x)}, we already know that if Ch′(x) is non-empty, then
by (1) at least one of its elements is below x. Where are other elements of
Ch′(x) located? Our claim now is that if (3) Ch′(x) ∪ {x} does not give rise
to FINFB, then Ch′(x) < x. For reductio, suppose that h
′ ⊥e′ H(x)} and
e′ SLR x. By the assumption (3), there is h′′ ∈ Πe′〈h′〉 ∩ H(x), and hence
h′ ≡e′ h′′ and h′′ ∈ H(x), which contradicts h′ ⊥e′ H(x).
For a future reference, we will generalize slightly these observations and
put it as a fact:
Fact 41 If C(x) := {e ∈ W | ∃h : h ⊥e H(x)} is non-empty and C(x) ∪ {x}
does not give rise to FINFB, then C(x) < x.
It is worth noting that the fact is a special case of one of equivalences of
four various notions of modal funny business that Belnap (2002) and Belnap
(2003) established. It is a special case of the implication from the so-called
some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business to generalized primary slr
modal-correlation funny business.
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